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JURY NULLIFICATION, RACE, AND THE WIRE
I.	INTRODUCTION

Jury nullification has been a source of great debate in the legal arena, particularly
when dealing with race.1 There have been several episodes of alleged jury nullification
due to race throughout the history of the criminal justice system, most notably the
criminal trial of former football player O.J. Simpson, as well as the criminal trial of
Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell, the police officers in the Rodney King beating.2
Jury nullification has also appeared in the media, both observed by newspaper
journalists and created by television series directors.3 Many believe that juries that
racially identify with the criminal defendant and deliver a not guilty verdict—where
the evidence appears to overwhelmingly point to guilt—have engaged in jury
nullification. But what if this is not the case? What if the juries were merely
performing their civic duty responsibly? What if a guilty verdict was not possible due
to objective factors, such as reasonable doubt?
Focusing on these questions and how they relate to the racial aspect of jury
nullification, this article compares the fictional trial of Senator Clay Davis from the
popular Home Box Office (HBO) television show The Wire to the real-life trial of
former Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon. Davis’s trial was a study in race- and classbased jury nullification, while Dixon’s trial was perceived as a rejection of that
practice. Part II outlines the history of jury nullification. Part III provides a brief
description of The Wire. Part IV examines the fictional trial of Senator Clay Davis
and the real-life trial of Sheila Dixon, and the reasons for their disparate results.
Finally, Part V concludes brief ly with what we can deduce from the two trials
regarding jury nullification’s role in the criminal justice system.
II. jury nullification

A. A Brief History

Jury nullification is a legal concept that typically becomes the topic of conversation
and heated debate whenever an intensely publicized jury trial does not render the
verdict that the public anticipates. Jury nullification is defined as:
A jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply
the law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social
issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is
contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness.4

1.

See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J.
677 (1995); Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury Nullification, 32 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 285 (1999).

2.

Marder, supra note 1, at 285.

3.

See, e.g., infra Parts II, IV.

4.

Black’s Law Dictionary 936 (9th ed. 2009); see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d
Cir. 1997) (defining jury nullification as “a violation of a juror’s oath to apply the law as instructed by
the court—in the words of the standard oath administered to jurors in the federal courts, to ‘render a
true verdict according to the law and the evidence’” (quoting Fed. Judicial Ctr., Benchbook for U.S.
District Court Judges 225 (4th ed. 1996, rev. 2000))).
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Nullification reflects the jury’s power to acquit a culpable defendant when it
concludes that the applicable law is immoral.5 The story of jury nullification begins
in England6 and makes its way across the Atlantic Ocean with the establishment of
the American colonies.7 One of the most significant cases of jury nullification in
colonial times was the acquittal of John Peter Zenger.8 Zenger was tried for seditious
libel for publishing statements that were critical of British colonial rule in America.9
Ignoring the judge’s instructions and following the advice of Zenger’s attorney,
Andrew Hamilton, “to see with their eyes, to hear with their own ears, and to make
use of their own consciences and understandings, in judging the lives, liberties or
estates of their fellow subjects,”10 the jury famously voted to acquit Zenger.11
In Sparf v. United States, two sailors appealed their murder convictions, arguing
that the trial court’s refusal of the defendants’ requested jury instructions improperly
interfered with the jurors’ discretion to convict the defendants of the lesser charge of
manslaughter.12 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the trial court did not “transcend[]
its authority” in refusing the defendants’ requested jury instruction and rejected the
proposition that juries had the right to judge the law,13 stating:
Indeed, if a jury may rightfully disregard the direction of the court in [a]
matter of law, and determine for themselves what the law is in the particular

5.

See Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do
Justice?, 30 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 239, 244 (1993).

6.

In the famous Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.), a judge ordered the release of British
jurors who had been imprisoned for ignoring a trial judge’s instructions on the law and refusing to
convict William Penn and Edward Mead of unlawful assembly.

7.

Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National Center
for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1249, 1256 (2003).

8.

Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 51, 57 (1980).

9.

Butler, supra note 1, at 702. Andrew Hamilton, Zenger’s defense attorney, argued that the jury should
ignore the judge’s instructions because the jury “had the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law
and the facts.” Id. (quoting Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate,
91 W. Va. L. Rev. 389, 414 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also John Peter Zenger and
Freedom of the Press, Const. Rts. Found. (2006), http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-223-b-john-peter-zenger-and-freedom-of-the-press.html.

10.

Butler, supra note 1, at 702 (quoting James Alexander, A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial
of John Peter Zenger, Printer of the New York Weekly Journal 93 (Stanley N. Katz ed.,
Belknap Press 1963) (1736)). Zenger’s attorney used the reasoning from Bushell’s Case to persuade the
jurors to acquit Zenger. Id.

11.

Weinstein, supra note 5, at 241.

12.

156 U.S. 51, 52, 62–63 (1985); Clay S. Conrad, Jury Nullification: The Evolution of a
Doctrine 102–03 (1998) (“The defense appealed, contending among other things that the trial court’s
instructions to the jury improperly controlled the jury and induced them to convict of murder, instead of
manslaughter.”).

13.

Sparf, 156 U.S. at 63–64; Conrad, supra note 12, at 103 (“Justice Harlan denied that juries had the
right to judge the law, or that they had ever had such a right.”).
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case before them, it is difficult to perceive any legal ground upon which a
verdict of conviction can be set aside by the court as being against law.14

In the majority opinion, Justice Harlan stated that the duty of the court was to
“expound the law” and the duty of the jury was to apply the expounded law to the
facts before it.15 Significantly, the Court implicitly acknowledged jury nullification as
a feature of the criminal justice system. While it stated that a jury’s duty is to apply
the law as instructed by the judge, it noted that judges have no recourse if jurors acquit
a defendant despite overwhelming evidence supporting a guilty verdict.16 Since the
Sparf decision, the Supreme Court has characterized jury nullification as the
assumption of a power which a jury has no right to exercise17 and as the unreviewable
power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons.18
In Sparf, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the jury may be “expressly
empower[ed]” to determine both the law and the facts where states have enacted
constitutional or statutory provisions addressing the function of the jury.19 Maryland
is one of the few states to statutorily acknowledge the existence of jury nullification. 20
Article 23 of Maryland’s Constitution states: “In the trial of all criminal cases, the
Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass
upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.”21 This language appears
to allow jurors to adjudicate questions of law as well as of fact; but Maryland legal
precedent has indicated otherwise.22
The Supreme Court had an opportunity in Brady v. Maryland to review the
specific state constitutional language that had been interpreted by Maryland courts to
14.

Sparf, 156 U.S. at 101.

15.

Id. at 106; see also Paul Mark Sandler with Matthew A.S. Esworthy, Commentary: Jury Nullification: A
Quixotic Theory Part I, Daily Rec. (Balt.), May 19, 2006 [hereinafter Sandler, Part I ] , available at
http://www.shapirosher.com/news/JuryNullificationPartOne.htm (“The decision provided that it is the
duty of [federal] juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as
they find them to be from the evidence.”).

16.

See Sandler, Part I, supra note 15, at 80–81; Weinstein, supra note 5, at 241– 42; Hannaford-Agor &
Hans, supra note 7, at 1258.

17.

Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932); see also Sandler, Part I, supra note 15.

18.

United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 63 (1984); see also Sandler, Part I, supra note 15.

19.

Sparf, 156 U.S. at 64; see also Conrad, supra note 12, at 106 (“[W]here states so provided, either by
statute or by constitutional provision, jurors would be considered judges of the law.”).

20. Sandler, Part I, supra note 15; Paul Mark Sandler with Matthew A.S. Esworthy, Commentary: Jury

Nullification: A Quixotic Theory Part II, Daily Rec. (Balt.), Jun. 2, 2006 [hereinafter Sandler, Part II],
available at http://www.shapirosher.com/news/JuryNullificationPartTwo.htm.

21.

Md. Const. art. 23.

22.

Blackwell v. Maryland, 278 Md. 466, 479 (1976) (stating that the jury’s power to judge the law did not
give them discretion to make new law or to ignore laws already enacted and currently in force); Giles v.
Maryland, 229 Md. 370 (1962) (limiting the scope and breadth of Article 23); Franklin v. Maryland, 12
Md. 236, 245–46 (1858) (holding that the jury could not decide whether a law was constitutional); see
also Sandler Part II, supra note 20.
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explicitly allow for jury nullification.23 On certiorari from the Maryland Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court held that suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused violates due process “where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment.”24 In its discussion, the Court noted that Maryland law, on its
face, seems to allow juries in criminal cases to determine the admissibility of such
evidence on the issue of innocence or guilt; however, the Court explained that the
language of Article 23 “does not mean precisely what it seems to say.”25 The Supreme
Court recognized that the current effect of Article 23 had been restricted by several
statutory exceptions and judicial construction of the language.26 In Brady, the Supreme
Court found that it was the trial court, not the jury, that reviewed the admissibility of
evidence on the issue of the innocence or guilt of the accused.27 The Supreme Court
affirmed the Court of Appeals determination that the appellant’s due process rights
had been violated and its remand to the trial court on the issue of punishment only.28
Despite the statutory and judicial restrictions placed upon it, jury nullification is
always going to be a legitimate theory, regardless of whether or not it is an explicit
state constitutional right. Juries will always issue verdicts that come from their
individual evaluation of evidence and personal experience.29 Juries are not charged
with “blindly and mechanically applying the law,” but rather with “doing justice in
light of the law, the evidence presented at trial, and their own knowledge of society
and the world.”30
B. Race and Jury Nullification
		

1. The Social Causes

Jury nullification is often attributed to juries that identify with and share the
same characteristics as the defendant, such as the defendant’s racial or ethnic
23.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, two defendants, Brady and Boblit, were prosecuted
and convicted of murder. Id. at 84. Brady admitted being involved in the murder, but claimed that
Boblit had done the actual killing. Id. During the trial, the prosecution withheld a written statement by
Boblit confessing that he had performed the act of killing by himself, and Brady did not discover this
evidence until after his conviction was affirmed. Id. Based on this newly discovered evidence, Brady
moved for a new trial. Id. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the suppressed confession denied
Brady due process of law, but that it could not have reduced Brady’s offense to anything lower than
murder in the first degree, and remanded the case for retrial on the issue of punishment only. Id. at 85.

24.

Id. at 87.

25.

Id. at 89.

26. Id. (citing Giles v. Maryland, 183 A.2d 359 (Md. 1962), appeal dismissed, 373 U.S. 767 (1963)).
27.

Id. Similarly, in Stevenson v. Maryland, 423 A.2d 558, 564 (Md. 1980), the Maryland Court of Appeals
clarified the jury’s responsibility to only determine the equity and justice in applying the law of a crime
to the facts presented and not whether evidence should be admitted, whether witnesses are competent to
testify, whether the court has jurisdiction, or whether the statutes are constitutional. Id.

28. Brady, 373 U.S. at 90 –91.
29. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 244.
30. Id. at 244 – 45.
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background, socioeconomic status, or value system.31 The occurrence of this type of
nullification has been attributed to a potential response to social conditions, including
the perception that the criminal justice system targets minorities.32 One example is
the “Bronx jury.” 33 This term originally described a jury consisting mostly of
minorities in the Bronx, New York, that refuses to convict minority defendants. 34
Today, “Bronx juries” are not limited to the Bronx but extend to other cities with
large minority populations, such as Baltimore, Maryland. 35
Two explanations—which are not mutually exclusive of one another—have been
posited for this phenomenon. One explanation asserts that jurors are making a
statement to focus attention on racism in the criminal justice system and police
conduct towards minorities.36 The second contends that juries are not nullifying, but
are instead actually focusing on reasonable doubt, which is drawn from the minority
juror’s experiences with police misconduct and a belief among minorities that police
are often willing to lie on the stand.37 In cities with large minority populations such
as Baltimore, many citizens have first-hand experience with police harassment—such
as aggressive zero-tolerance drug policies and stereotypical “stop and frisk”
searches38—that makes jurors distrustful of police testimony.39
Professor Paul Butler raises the issues of race and jury nullification in his thoughtprovoking essay, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System.40 Professor Butler argues that race is sometimes a legally and morally
appropriate factor for jurors to consider when deliberating on a guilty verdict.41
Professor Butler asserts that African American jurors may, and should, wield jury
nullification as a sword to combat a racist criminal justice system.42 Professor Butler
urges African American jurors to approach jury duty by being aware of its political

31.

Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 7, at 1264.

32.

Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877, 900 (1999).

33.

Id. at 899.

34. Id. at 899–900.
35.

See id. at 900 n.114, 901.

36. Id. at 900.
37.

Id. at 901.

38. Shawn M. Flower, Disparities in Jury Outcomes: Baltimore City v. Three Surrounding

Jurisdictions—An Empirical Examination 22 (2008), available at www.abell.org/pubsitems/
Disparities-cj.908.pdf.

39.

Id.; see also Art Buist, The Reasons Behind “Jury Nullification,” Your Pub. Radio, http://www.public
broadcasting.net/wypr/news.newsmain?action=article&ARTICLE_ID=1132465&sectionID=276 (last
updated Aug. 20, 2008).

40. Butler, supra note 1, at 677.
41.

Id. at 679.

42.

See id. at 695–97.
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nature and their right to exercise their jury nullification power “in the interest of the
black community.”43
Professor Andrew Leipold responds to Professor Butler’s essay by stating that
frequent race-based nullification would only help solidify and institutionalize racism
within the criminal justice system.44 Professor Leipold acknowledges that African
Americans comprise a hugely disproportionate percentage of criminal defendants
and the prison population;45 to do otherwise would be to turn a blind eye to the
exponential growth of minorities in the prison system.46 However, he warns that
deliberately engaging in a course of race-based nullification is “foolish and
dangerous.”47 According to Professor Leipold, Professor Butler’s proposal is “foolish”
because of various false assumptions and flawed logic.48 Professor Butler’s proposal
rests on the assumptions that black jurors are alienated from the justice system, lack
political means for redressing their issues, and will only nullify nonviolent, victimless
crimes.49 Further, Professor Leipold argues that Professor Butler’s proposal is
“dangerous” because the proposal would more likely harm African Americans than
help them. Professor Leipold asserts that race-based decision making would inevitably
perpetuate harmful stereotypes of African Americans, polarize a society already
struggling with racial division, and sadly give up on the fight for equal treatment.50
Similarly, Professor Nancy Marder— who has researched and written extensively
on the subject of juries and jury nullification—strongly asserts that false claims of
jury nullification perpetuate racial stereotypes, particularly of a majority African
American jury.51 Marder notes that after the acquittal of O.J. Simpson, the press
maintained that jury nullification was responsible for the verdict, and frequently
attacked the jurors’ reasoning capabilities.52 Jurors’ explanations of reasonable doubt
as a reason for the verdict were largely ignored by the press, which seemed to prefer
the nullification theory.53
43.

Id. at 715.

44. Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44

UCLA L. Rev. 109, 112 (1996).

45.

Id. at 111.

46. Id.
47.

Id.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 128.
50. Id. at 139. It should be noted that Professor Butler responds to Professor Leipold’s critique with an

equally passionate article, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 143 (1996).
Butler emphasizes that race-based jury nullification has two objectives: first, to further “black self help”
by reducing the number of African Americans under criminal supervision, and second, to send a political
message that African Americans “no longer will tolerate the criminal solutions to problems like racism
and poverty.” Id. at 149.

51.

Marder, supra note 1, at 303.

52.

Id. at 302.

53.

Id.
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Professor Marder posits that both reasonable doubt and the making of an honest
mistake are often confused with jurors deliberately nullifying the law54 and that
“mere mistake is not nullification.”55 Nullification requires a juror to have subjective
intent, while mistake does not—even though the end result, an acquittal, is the
same.56 Professor Marder notes that a jury is composed of human decision makers
who are fallible.57 It is possible for a juror to make an honest mistake about any
number of things during the trial process, despite the judicial system’s best efforts to
help jurors avoid these mistakes.58 Additionally, a person’s view about whether a jury
rendered the correct verdict and employed a logical line of reasoning will depend on
a combination of factors, such as that person’s age, gender, religion, and employment,
among others.59 Thus, an individual (such as a reporter) judging from outside the
trial experience cannot definitively state that the jury engaged in nullification without
the benefit of all the evidence, testimony, and arguments, as well as actually
participating in jury deliberations.
		

2. Vigilantism

Jury nullification can also be the result of juries that do not apply the law to a
defendant whom they perceive as having honorable motives. In Detroit, Michigan,
neighbors took matters into their own hands against drug dealers who had converted
a once-peaceful neighborhood of working-class families into a dangerous environment
where children could not play outdoors because drug dealers would shoot at each
other in broad daylight.60 The focal point of the violence was a crack house where
drug dealers would sell their contraband.61 Calls to the police became routine and had
no effect on the drug activity and violence.62 Finally, two neighbors had enough and
burned down the crack house, which effectively wiped out the violence.63

54. See id. at 293.
55.

Marder, supra note 32, at 882. Professor Marder stresses that even unreasonable mistakes such as
misunderstanding the law, misjudging the credibility of a witness, or overlooking an important piece of
evidence are not the same as jury nullification. Id. at 883.

56. See id. at 883.
57.

Marder, supra note 1, at 293.

58. See Marder, supra note 32, at 883–84. To avoid jury mistakes, “courts have experimented with changes

in procedure, such as allowing jurors to take notes, to submit written questions to the judge, to receive
preliminary instructions, to take written instructions into the jury room, and to be instructed in plain
language that laypersons can understand.” Id. at 884 (footnotes omitted).

59.

Marder, supra note 1, at 304.

60. Isabel Wilkerson, ‘Crack House’ Fire: Justice or Vigilantism?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1988, § 1, at 1.
61.

Id.

62. See id.
63. Id.
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The two men freely admitted in open court that they were guilty of arson.64 The
jury deliberated for two and a half hours before acquitting them.65 One juror even
stated that he would have burned the house down too, or, maybe worse: “I would
have been more violent.”66 The social conditions and lack of response from law
enforcement officials triggered the neighbors to take drastic action; the jury
recognized that and even approved.67 Further, at the time, many neighborhoods
around the nation were taking matters into their own hands because they were
receiving little or no assistance from the police.68 The acquittal of the two men who
had burned down the crack house reflected a nationwide reaction of families that
would no longer live in neighborhoods where violence and crime had taken over.69
		

3. Countervailing Factors

Before one assumes that race provides a direct corollary to jury nullification, it is
important to consider that juries are also motivated by values and core beliefs.70
Indeed, demographics by themselves have little predictive value on jury decision
making.71 For example, the fact that a person is a Caucasian female will have little
predictive implication regarding her opinion toward abortion.72 Rather, the values
that the woman embraces—women’s rights versus the rights, if any, of the fetus—
will determine her opinion.73 An analogous example in criminal law would be the
relationship between a person’s background versus her opinion on the fairness of a
legal outcome.74 One’s trust in the courts, ambiguity in the evidence, and other
variables are significant predictors of a juror’s perception of outcome fairness.75 Race,
a factor often directly associated with jury nullification, loses statistical significance
when several variables are considered simultaneously.76
In addition to being motivated by values and core beliefs, a jury is often the last
entity in the judicial process that the public can blame for an unpopular and
64. Id.
65.

Id.

66. Id.
67.

Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Samuel H. Solomon, DOAR Litig. Consulting, How Jurors Make Decisions: A Practical

and Systematic Approach to Understanding Jury Behavior 3 (2002), available at http://www.
doar.com/apps/uploads/literature62_HowJurorsMakeDecisions.pdf.

71.

Id. at 6.

72. Id.
73. See id.
74.

See Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 7, at 1268–70.

75. See id. at 1270.
76. See id.
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supposedly nullified verdict. Despite mistakes in jury deliberations and legitimate
occasions for reasonable doubt, juries tend to become a convenient scapegoat.77
However, to claim that a jury nullified because it racially identified with the defendant
does not take into account the evidence the jury heard and why the jurors chose to
deliver the verdict they did.78 If the prosecution has not proven its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, then it is a lack of evidence, not nullification, that has led to
acquittal.79 “Juries do not judge guilt in the abstract, but only as proven by the
prosecution in a court of law.”80 A jury accused of delivering the wrong verdict by the
public may be delivering the only verdict supportable by the facts at trial.81
		

4. The Media’s Role

The media exacerbate the perceived occurrence of jury nullification. Print and
television press coverage of high-profile cases tends to focus on the juries, especially
if the possibility of nullification exists. For example, some commentators viewed the
O.J. Simpson case as nullification in response to social conditions.82 In their view,
the majority African American jury engaged in nullification to send a variety of
messages of protest to white America, including
telling white America that they were tired of being singled out for prosecution,
for having a disproportionate number of African-American men sent to
prison, for allowing police officers to engage in misconduct and racism, and
for maintaining a system of justice that had a long history of discriminating
against African Americans.83

To the press, nullification seemed the only plausible rationale possible, in light of
weighty evidence against Simpson and after so little time spent in deliberation.84
Professor Marder believes that many of the mainstream newspaper article writers
were misinterpreting jury nullification.85 For example, some journalists thought that
the jury based its verdict on emotion, rather than reason, and that this led to
nullification.86 Professor Marder rejects this theory and argues that emotion is not a
hallmark of nullification; rather, a jury can and will decide to nullify after reaching a
verdict in a well reasoned and thoughtful manner.87 Citing legitimate counterarguments,
77.

See Conrad, supra note 12, at 203.

78. See id.
79. Id. at 203.
80. Id.
81.

Id.

82. See Marder, supra note 32, at 901.
83. Id.
84. Marder, supra note 1, at 288.
85. See id. at 289–90.
86. Id. at 290.
87.

See id.
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which the jurors themselves attempted to make, Professor Marder underscores the
importance of these objective factors in the face of the subjective intent needed to
engage in jury nullification.88
III. The Wire

The Wire was a popular HBO television series that received critical acclaim for its
realistic portrayal of urban life in Baltimore.89 The events portrayed in The Wire’s
final season closely reflect the main points of contention within the jury nullification
debate and serve as an excellent conversational springboard for this topic.
The Wire is a story about “the America left behind.”90 David Simon and Ed Burns,
its co-creators, brought a uniquely intimate perspective to the series by virtue of their
past lives as a part of Baltimore’s work force. Simon is a former reporter for The
Baltimore Sun and Burns is a retired Baltimore homicide detective.91 The writing staff
consisted of individuals who had direct knowledge and experience with the various
themes of The Wire’s five seasons: public housing, unions, politics, schools, and the
drug war.92 The writers included William F. Zorzi, who covered the backrooms of
Baltimore politics for years before joining the writing staff.93 A “bleak yet accurate
portrait of social realities in Baltimore’s inner city,”94 co-creator David Simon has said
in interviews that the show was structured as “a political provocation.”95
The Wire was also about race. Race was a constant undercurrent on the show,
regardless of the context. Baltimore is a largely African American city.96 Most of its
citizens are black.97 Most of its politicians, police officers, students, and criminals are
black.98 And on The Wire, Baltimore was presided over by a white mayor, Tommy
Carcetti—a character modeled in part after a former white Baltimore politician
88. See id. at 290–91 (“The most compelling reason for concluding that the Simpson verdict was not the

result of a nullifying jury is that the jurors who explained their reasoning said that they reached their
verdict based on reasonable doubt. All the jurors who were interviewed after the verdict said that they
voted for acquittal because they believed the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.”).

89. See Jacob Weisberg, The Wire on Fire, Slate (Sept. 13, 2006, 5:44 AM), http://www.slate.com/

id/2149566.

90. David Simon, Prologue to Rafael Alvarez, T he Wire : Truth Be Told 9 (2009).
91.

See id. at 9–10; Alvarez, supra note 90, at 48.

92.

See Simon, supra note 90, at 10.

93.

Id.

94. Meghan O’Rourke, Behind The Wire, Slate (Dec. 1, 2006, 2:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2154694/

nav/tap1/.

95. See id.
96. See Demographic Statistics for Baltimore City, Maryland, FedStats, http://www.fedstats.gov/qf/

states/24/24510.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).

97.

Id.

98. See id.
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whose ascension to mayor was particularly intriguing in a majority black city. 99 In its
fifth and final season, The Wire portrayed the indictment, trial, and acquittal of the
fictional Maryland State Senator Clay Davis, the “shamelessly larcenous” politician
who is also African American.100 By boldly aligning himself as someone who
empathizes with the West Baltimore jurors’ racial background, socio-economic
status, and value system, Davis was acquitted despite the weighty evidence against
him and his own admission of the facts underlying the charges against him.
IV.	A Tale of Two West Baltimore Politicians and Their Trials

A. The Wire: Senator Clay Davis

In the third season of The Wire, the show began to focus on political figures in
Baltimore. One character, State Senator Clay Davis, was “[a] savvy and charismatic
hustler” whose “only agenda was to raise money for himself and his political allies.”101
Davis came from the streets of West Baltimore—a neighborhood where poverty and
crime have been a part of everyday life102—and he was beloved by his constituents.
He had connections with drug dealers and a reputation for taking bribes—regardless
of their source—in exchange for loyalty and favors.103 In season three, we see Davis
accepting $25,000 from Stringer Bell, a drug kingpin who is branching out into real
estate development, in return for obtaining building permits for Bell’s project.104
In season five, State’s Attorney Rupert Bond targeted Davis for prosecution.105
Davis was indicted for siphoning money earmarked for community activities, such as
a neighborhood basketball facility called the West Baltimore Hoops Charity.106 At
the press conference announcing Davis’s indictment, State’s Attorney Bond accused
Davis of creating “a network of charitable and non-profit organizations whose
purpose was to accumulate cash for his private use.”107 The Davis trial in The Wire
was a study in racial and class conflict, and Clay Davis was the primary vehicle for
highlighting that conflict.
99. See Clarence Page, O’Malley’s Win Helps Bridge Racial Divide, Balt. Sun, Sept. 27, 1999, at 11A.

Carcetti’s character was based in large part on a real-life Mayor of Baltimore, and later Governor of
Maryland, Martin O’Malley. See Alvarez, supra note 90, at 277.

100. Alvarez, supra note 90, at 272.
101. State Senator R. Clayton “Clay” Davis Character Biography, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/the-wire/cast-

and-crew/r-clayton-clay-davis/index.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).

102. See Justin Fenton, As Police Grieve, 5 People Killed in Less Than a Day, Balt. Sun, Oct. 27, 2010, at 1A;

Baltimore Crime Numbers Continue Climbing, WBAL-TV 11 (Balt.), Apr. 25, 2006, http://www.wbaltv.
com/r/8995257/detail.html; Annie Linskey, 20-Year Life Gap Separates City’s Poorest, Wealthy, Balt.
Sun, Oct. 16, 2008, at 1A (Telegraph).

103. See Alvarez, supra note 90, at 87; The Wire: Lessons (HBO broadcast July 28, 2002).
104. Alvarez, supra note 90, at 238; The Wire: Homecoming (HBO broadcast Oct. 31, 2004).
105. Alvarez, supra note 90, at 447; The Wire: React Quotes (HBO broadcast Feb. 3, 2008).
106. The Wire: Took (HBO broadcast Feb. 17, 2008).
107. The Wire: React Quotes, supra note 105, at 5:55.
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At the trial, the prosecution’s major witness was Senator Davis’s driver, DayDay.108 Day-Day testified that the entire $40,000 he received as the executive director
of the West Baltimore Hoops Charity went back to Davis, in cash.109 On cross
examination, Day-Day, a convicted felon who testified in return for a grant of
immunity, admitted that there was no proof, other than his own testimony, that
Davis ever received that cash.110
However, the real star of the trial was Clay Davis himself. Speaking to a jury
that consisted of nine African Americans, one Asian woman, and two white males,
Davis spun a tale of life in “my neck of the woods”111 in West Baltimore, and claimed
to be a modern day Jimmy Walker, if not Robin Hood.112 Under a direct exam by his
attorney, which is best described as a faux cross-examination, Davis freely admitted
to taking the money from his charities: “You bet it all went into my account. It made
it easier to do my job. And at the end of the day, not one penny stayed with me.”113
When his lawyer asked what he did with an $11,000 check he had cashed the
previous January, Davis answered, “Some went to pay everyone’s BGE, ’cause half
my district was gonna have the heat turned off. And some went for puff jackets for
them that’s got children in need.”114 Life in West Baltimore was “strictly cash and
carry,”115 meaning that there is a simple exchange of money for necessities. As Davis
spoke, some in the gallery murmured in agreement.116 Further, Davis pointed out the
class differences between himself (and, by extension, his constituents in West
Baltimore) and State’s Attorney Bond, who was also African American, saying, “I
don’t know how they do things out in Roland Park [an upscale Baltimore
neighborhood]117—maybe Prosecutor ‘O-Bond-a’ can enlighten me on that.”118
Davis was unapologetic, and even indignant, about using charity dollars to fill
the needs of his constituents. “You give me $20,000 for a basketball and an air pump,
I am pulling goodly on that for whatever and whoever comes at me,” he declared.119
That “whatever and whoever” included constituents who needed money to pay for a
funeral, bail a child out from jail, buy clothing for a job interview, or pay for a child’s

108. The Wire: Took, supra note 106.
109. Id.; Alvarez, supra note 90, at 466.
110. The Wire: Took, supra note 106.
111. Id. at 49:36.
112. See Alvarez, supra note 90, at 468.
113. The Wire: Took, supra note 106, at 49:01.
114. Id. at 49:23.
115. Id. at 50:18.
116. Id.
117. See Linskey, supra note 102.
118. The Wire: Took, supra note 106, at 50:09.
119. Id. at 50:56.
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asthma medicine.120 “And excuse me if I didn’t ask that old arthur-itis woman for a
receipt, or that young mother who needed the Similac to sign some damn piece of
paper so I don’t have to be up in this box explaining to people who’ve never been in
our neck of the woods how things truly are.”121
Davis then concluded his soliloquy by tearfully and blatantly playing the
nullification card:
And if a jury of my peers—you all— deem it right and true for me to walk out
of here an upright and justified man, well I ain’t gonna lie to you. I’m gonna
do the same damn thing tomorrow, and the day after that, and the day after
that, until they lay me out at March’s Funeral Home and truck me off to Mt.
Auburn.122

With that, the gallery burst into applause, and the prosecutors slumped in their
chairs, already knowing the trial’s outcome.123 The Wire concluded this vignette by
showing Davis addressing his supporters on the same courthouse steps where State’s
Attorney Bond had announced Davis’s indictment.124 When Bond, watching this
scene unfold, asked his fellow prosecutor, Assistant State’s Attorney Rhonda
Pearlman, “What the fuck just happened?” she replied, “Whatever it was, they don’t
teach it in law school.”125
Davis’s acquittal could be viewed as a classic example of jury nullification. A
predominantly African American jury reacted negatively to the prosecution of one of
its own—whom they had elected to serve them—for using the system to help his
constituents when it was clear the system would not have done that itself. Professor
Butler writes that, when African Americans commit jury nullification, it is not a
“betrayal of democracy,” as some might argue, because “‘democracy,’ as practiced in
the United States, has betrayed African Americans far more than they could ever
betray it.”126 Here, as claimed by Clay Davis, democracy betrayed West Baltimore by
giving his community money for basketballs and pumps instead of clothing, medicine,
or decent shelter for those who need it. By acquitting Davis, the jury reversed that
betrayal.
The writers of The Wire inserted an interesting coda to the Clay Davis saga. After
Davis’s acquittal, he was approached by a detective, Lester Freamon, who confronted
him with false statements Davis had made on a mortgage application.127 Freamon
threatened to take the application to the U.S. Attorney’s Office and pointed out to
Davis that a federal jury would not have the same racial composition as a Baltimore
120. Id. at 51:08.
121. Id. at 51:21.
122. Id. at 51:39.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 53:33.
126. Butler, supra note 1, at 706.
127. The Wire: Clarifications (HBO broadcast Feb. 24, 2008); see also Alvarez, supra note 90, at 469.

954

VOLUME 55 | 2010/11

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

jury, an obvious reference to the nullification that occurred at Davis’s trial.128 Davis,
sensing that his fortunes had turned, began to cooperate and provided information
about drug dealers and their corrupt counsel.129
B. Baltimore Mayor Sheila Ann Dixon

Sheila Ann Dixon was Baltimore’s first African American woman mayor, elected
in November 2007 for a four-year term.130 Like the fictional Clay Davis, Sheila
Dixon was one of West Baltimore’s own.131 Dixon was a teacher by training, with
degrees from Towson University and Johns Hopkins University.132 When Dixon
entered politics, she rose through the ranks of City Council to become the first
African American woman elected as president of the City Council.133
Dixon had been under intense investigation by the Maryland State Prosecutor’s
Office as part of a long-running corruption probe into City Hall finances.134 The
investigation was triggered by Dixon’s romantic involvement with Ronald Lipscomb,
a real estate developer who conducted business with the city.135 Lipscomb gave Dixon
gifts that she failed to report to the Baltimore City Ethics Board. This nondisclosure
violated Baltimore ethics law, requiring the mayor and other officials to file an ethics
form under penalty of perjury reporting all gifts received from individuals doing
business with the city of Baltimore.136 In June 2008, pursuant to a search warrant,
Dixon’s home was searched and documents were seized by agents of the Maryland
128. The Wire: Clarifications (HBO broadcast Feb. 24, 2008); Alvarez, supra note 90, at 469. A federal jury

would have been drawn from Baltimore City’s neighboring suburbs, populating a more affluent and
predominantly white jury pool—one that would not lead to jury nullification for Davis. See Flower,
supra note 38, at 20.

129. The Wire: Late Editions (HBO broadcast Mar. 9, 2008); Alvarez, supra note 90, at 477. Of course,

Freamon’s threat to go to the U.S. Attorney was a ruse, since that office had already declined to prosecute
Davis in light of his prior acquittal. See The Wire: Late Editions (HBO broadcast Mar. 9, 2008).

130. See Sheila Dixon, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/

people/d/sheila_dixon/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=sheila%20dixon&st=cse; Annie Linskey & Julie
Bykowicz, Dixon Indicted, Balt. Sun, Jan. 10, 2009, at 9A (Local).

131. See Christina Antoniades, The Unsinkable Sheila Dixon, Balt. Mag., Nov. 2008, available at http://

www.baltimoremagazine.net/people/2008/11/the-unsinkable-sheila-dixon.

132. Id.
133. Ian Urbina, Trial Begins for Baltimore Mayor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2009, at A16.
134. Dixon Indicted on Corruption Charges, WBAL-TV 11 (Balt.), Jan. 10, 2009, http://www.wbaltv.com/

politics/18445702/detail.html; see also Henri E. Cauvin, On Other Side of Courtroom, Still High
Profile; After Decades as a Prosecutor, Lawyer Jumps to Defense of Md. Politicians, Wash. Post, Aug. 19,
2008, at B01 (Metro).

135. Scott Dance, Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon Indicted, Balt. Bus. J., Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://

baltimore.bizjournals.com/baltimore/stories/2009/01/05/daily65.html; Byron Warnken, Baltimore
Mayor Sheila Dixon Indicted on Twelve Counts, Warnken, LLC Attorneys at Law (Jan. 10, 2009),
http://www.findmarylandlawyer.com/Baltimore-Mayor-Sheila-Dixon-Indicted-on-Twelve-Counts.

136. Indictment of Baltimore Mayor Sheila A. Dixon, Perjury Counts, Press Releases & Official Reports, Off. of

the Md. State Prosecutor, http://www.ospmd.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2011); Warnken, supra note
135.
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State Prosecutor’s Office.137 During the search, agents seized several gift cards, an
“X-Box” video game console, and other electronics that had been purchased at Best
Buy with gift cards.138 A Baltimore grand jury originally indicted Dixon in January
2009; however, some of the counts were dismissed due to impermissible testimony
about Dixon’s alleged actions that was protected by Dixon’s legislative privilege.139 In
July 2009, two new indictments were filed against Dixon on nine counts, including
two counts of perjury, three counts of theft, three counts of fraudulent misappropriation
by fiduciary, and one count of misconduct in office.140 The factual underpinning of
the State’s case was that Dixon had solicited and obtained gift cards from real estate
developers with whom she was connected under the guise of giving the cards to the
needy, but instead kept the gift cards for her own personal use—that is, Dixon was
Clay Davis, but on a smaller scale.141
Dixon’s real-life trial on the theft charges differed from Davis’s fictional trial in
two respects. First, Dixon’s jury was more diverse than Davis’s jury. Seven jurors
were African American, three were white, one was Asian American, and one
identified herself as Native American/Hispanic.142 Nine of the jurors were women.143
Secondly, as discussed below, Dixon’s defense strategy did not include an invitation
for jury nullification.
These two factors ran counter to what experts had predicted. News articles
quoted prominent defense attorneys and jury experts who explained that Baltimore
juries tended to show sympathy for African American defendants.144 As one defense
attorney, Warren A. Brown, told the Associated Press when describing Baltimore
juries: “To hell with the law, to hell with the facts, they will render a verdict they
think is fair, is right.”145 Statistics seemed to bear this out. A study conducted by the
Abell Foundation found that juries in Baltimore City were less likely to convict
137. Ryan Sharrow & Heather Harlan Warnack, Investigators Seize Documents in Raid of Mayor Sheila Dixon’s

Home, Balt. Bus. J., June 17, 2008, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/stories/2008/06/
16/daily14.html.

138. Urbina, supra note 133.
139. Press Release, State of Md. Office of State Prosecutor, Baltimore City Mayor Sheila A. Dixon Re-Charged

(July 29, 2009), http://www.ospmd.org/DynaContent/PressReleases/DixonPressRelease072909.pdf.

140. Perjury Indictment at paras. 38, 46, Maryland v. Dixon, No. 109210016 (Md. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2009),

available at http://www.ospmd.org/DynaContent/PressReleases/DixonIndictmentPerjury072909.pdf;
Theft Indictment at paras. 54–66, Maryland v. Dixon, Case No. 109210016 (Md. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2009),
available at http://www.ospmd.org/DynaContent/PressReleases/DixonIndictmentTheft072909.pdf.

141. Urbina, supra note 133.
142. Statement of Judge Dennis M. Sweeney at the Sentencing of Defendant Sheila Ann Dixon at 6,

Maryland v. Dixon, Nos. 109210015 & 109210016 (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.
baltocts.state.md.us/highlighted_trials/Statement%20of%20Judge%20Sweeney.pdf.

143. Brendan Kearney, Jury for Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon’s Trial Mostly Black, Female, Daily Rec. (Balt.),

Nov. 10, 2009, at News.

144. Ben Nuckols, Editorial, Dixon May Count on Sympathetic Jurors, Balt. Sun, Jan. 15, 2009, at 3B.
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defendants than those in the surrounding suburban areas.146 Compared to the
suburbs, the Baltimore jury pool was two-thirds black and 92% of the defendants
were non-white.147
At Dixon’s trial on the theft charges, one of the prosecution’s key witnesses was
Patrick Turner, one of the real estate developers who gave Dixon the gift cards.148
Turner testified that the cards were meant for needy families and not the mayor
herself.149 In another instance of life imitating (or at least paraphrasing) art, Randall
Finney, a driver for another real estate developer, Ronald Lipscomb, played the part
of Day-Day. Finney testified that he purchased thirty to forty gift cards from at least
four different stores, and, pursuant to Mayor Dixon’s instructions, delivered the cards
on two separate occasions to Dixon’s driver in an East Baltimore parking lot.150 The
prosecutors also presented evidence showing that Dixon herself used some of the
cards she received.151
However, Mayor Dixon’s defense diverged markedly from that of Clay Davis.
Dixon did not testify and had four witnesses, one of whom was her pastor, who
testified as a character witness.152 Dixon’s defense team argued that the case against
her was thin and that the prosecution never proved the requisite intent on her part.153
The media anticipated an acquittal.154 Law professors, law enforcement officials,
defense attorneys, and even a jury-consulting firm all commented on the likelihood that
a minority jury would be sympathetic to a minority defendant.155 If life imitates art, then
The Wire’s acquittal of Senator Davis was also a prediction of Dixon’s verdict.
That prediction was wrong. Out of the seven theft counts from the indictment,
Dixon was found guilty of one misdemeanor count of fraudulent misappropriation by
a fiduciary, involving gift cards from Patrick Turner.156 Two counts related to
developer Ronald Lipscomb—the felony theft of gift cards and the fraudulent
146. Flower, supra note 38, at 4.
147. Id. at iii.
148. See Developer, Others Testify in Dixon Trial, WBAL-TV 11 (Balt.), Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.wbaltv.

com/news/21625873/detail.html.

149. Id.
150. Witness Testimony Begins in Dixon Trial, WBAL-TV 11 (Balt.), Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.wbaltv.com/

news/21605309/detail.html.

151. See id.
152. See Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon Convicted of Taking Gift Cards Meant for City’s Poor, N.Y. Daily News,

Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/12/01/2009-12-01_baltimore_mayor_
sheila_dixon_convicted_of_taking_gift_cards_meant_for_citys_poor.html.

153. See Julie Bykowicz & Annie Linskey, Dixon’s Fate in Jurors’ Hands, Balt. Sun, Nov. 20, 2009, at 1A.
154. See Nuckols, supra note 144.
155. Id.
156. Plea Agreement at 1–2, Maryland v. Dixon, Nos. 109210015 & 109210016 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City

Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://www.ospmd.org/DynaContent/PressReleases/Dixon%20plea.pdf;
Baltimore Mayor Guilty of Embezzlement, CNN.com, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/
CRIME/12/01/baltimore.mayor.crime/index.html.
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misappropriation by a fiduciary of gift cards—were thrown out because the
prosecution did not call Lipscomb to testify.157 Dixon was acquitted of two counts of
felony theft and one count of misconduct in office, and the jury failed to reach a
verdict on the count of fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary.158 Dixon also
ultimately reached a plea agreement on a misdemeanor perjury charge, was given a
probationary sentence, and agreed to resign.159
It was not lost on either the jurors or the judge that the media and the public had
anticipated a different outcome, and one not necessarily based on the facts. In obvious
response to what had been written in the press, both the jurors and the judge went to
significant, if not extraordinary, lengths to declare the Dixon verdict a triumph of
the jury system. The jury’s foreperson wrote a letter to the presiding judge in the
case, Judge Dennis M. Sweeney, which Judge Sweeney read into the record as part of
a larger statement at Dixon’s sentencing hearing.160 The foreperson presented the
letter “with a sense of accomplishment and pride.”161 She stated that the twelve jurors
represented the diversity of the city of Baltimore and came together to “fulfill a civic
duty,”162 and that “it has been an education, a privilege, and an honor to serve our
judicial system.”163
Judge Sweeney himself noted that the jurors were a “true cross-section of the
city,” with diversity of age, background, and occupation.164 Judge Sweeney also felt
compelled to comment on the objectivity and hard work of the jury:

157. Prosecution Rests; Lipscomb-Related Charges Thrown Out: Developer Considered Key Witness For Prosecution
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Many commentators glibly predicted even before jury selection began that a
hung jury split along lines of race, sex or income would be the result. In
contrast, from what I saw in this case all of the jurors took the case very
seriously put aside their personal biases and worked very hard together as a
team to resolve the case based on the evidence in the case and the law.165
V. CONCLUSION

The fact that jury nullification never played a role in the Dixon trial was obviously
significant to the press, the jury, and the judge. However, looking back, it should not
have surprised anyone. Unlike Clay Davis, Sheila Dixon never claimed to be a
populist Robin Hood, stealing from ill-designed bureaucratic coffers to give the poor
what they really needed and were not receiving. Nor, as the facts disclosed, could she.
Instead, the evidence was rather clear that she stole from the poor (i.e., by taking the
gift cards intended for them) and gave to herself (e.g., the X-Box 360). Regardless of
demographics, no jury’s core values could have been expected to condone Mayor
Dixon’s conduct.
In Sheila Dixon’s trial, life could not imitate art. The facts of Mayor Dixon’s case
got in the way, and, in any event, she could never have provided the performance
Clay Davis did on The Wire. Further, Mayor Dixon’s jury was more diverse than
Senator Davis’s jury. However, The Wire and the public’s pretrial perception of the
real-life Dixon trial illustrate an unavoidable fact: race is perceived—by real and
televised society alike—as playing an overarching role in our justice system.

165. Id. at 6–7.
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